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Edmundson has written an admirably concise yet powerful book. It blends a critical account of 
Rawls’ work with an original case for democratic socialism hewn from Rawlsian stone. In my 
opinion, this case has some flaws but it remains a timely contribution to the enduring quest for 
justice and social stability. 
 
The initial chapters dispatch the common misconception of Rawls as a supporter of welfare-state 
capitalism, unpack the Rawlsian case against private property in the means of production being a 
basic liberty, and examine what Rawls means by liberal socialism and property-owning 
democracy. Edmundson emphasizes James Meade and Joseph Schumpeter as inspirations for 
Rawls’ understanding of these regimes, as well as the British Labour Party’s policy of 
nationalizing major industries. Liberal socialism aims to achieve social equality through 
nationalization while property-owning democracy pursues the same end through the systematic 
distribution of the means of production among private individuals. 
 
These two regimes vie for the crown of justice. Edmundson marches us through the controversies 
emerging from Rawls’ work before settling the argument decisively in favor of liberal socialism. 
Political equality, built into Rawls’ first principle of justice, is not only formal but includes the fair 
value of political liberties preventing any particular class from dominating political outcomes. 
Inequalities in economic position inevitably lead to inequalities in political power. Fair value is a 
constitutional essential. So the issue of property must be settled at the second stage of Rawls’ 




While the desire to dominate must be curbed, it is fear of domination that bites because this drives 
even reasonable persons to seek elevated status. This constitutes the assurance problem that 
generates Rawls’ concern with stability. Citizens must be assured that the patterns of power 
permitted to emerge through institutions today will not eventually come to undermine those very 
institutions. At this point, Rawls’ second principle of justice, governing legitimate departures from 
equality for some social goods, takes the foreground. Compared to alternative distributive 
principles, such as average utility, the difference principle is more stable because it assures people 
that no policy shift will benefit anyone without benefitting the least well-off. So a tightly defined 
reciprocity is always in force. 
 
With that standard in mind, property-owning democracy’s potential advantage, that of permitting 
more economic growth, loses standing. A liberal socialism constitutionally guarantees all citizens 
fair access to the means of production while property-owning democracy can merely aim at that 
outcome. Socialism publicly affirms society as a cooperative venture based on reciprocity. It 
reduces the scope of legislative and judicial fine-tuning of property arrangements to keep fair value 
secured because any potentially powerful economic position will be publicly governed. By 
contrast, a property-owning democracy’s regular redistribution of capital assets is exposed to many 
sources of instability. For example, recipients of compensating capital grants will be tempted to 
hide their natural endowments so as to receive larger benefits. Citizens may lobby to privatize 
public assets for private gain. Taking private ownership of any significant means of production off 




Alongside this compelling argument, Edmundson makes vivid the urgency of Rawls’ life and 
work. The final chapter explains that Rawls’ reticence from commenting on real-world politics 
was not due to lack of interest. Avoiding everyday political commitments has allowed Rawls’ work 
to stay fresh for every new generation of scholars, unencumbered by the contingencies of particular 
political moments. Nevertheless, Rawls was politically engaged. He quietly supported the New 
Party, formed to contest the entrenched two-party system in the United States. Although party 
duopoly persists with constitutional backing to this day, Rawls’ orientation reflects his focus on 
the fundamental reform of social institutions. 
 
Where is the weakness? The argument that liberal socialism suffers fewer instabilities than 
property-owning democracy seems to hinge on a rather startling claim: ‘Bureaucrats and managers 
cannot extract rents – their role is never that of pure owners’ (157). This claim is definitional rather 
than practical. In reasonably competitive markets, entrepreneurs, analysts and professional 
investors act as independent, though fallible, checks on corporate managers, thus protecting capital 
owners. By contrast, taking firms outside of competitive markets gives managers and officials 
many ways to extract rents (in the sense of uncompensated benefits), whether the owners are public 
or private. Managers can raise their own income rather than profits. They can run corporate deficits 
for investments in projects that never bear fruit. They can run down assets by cutting back on 
supplies and maintenance until their value is depleted. Telling examples range from the infamous 
state-backed automobile manufacturer British Leyland to the Venezuelan oil industry. 
 
These practices may include corruption, but that is not their essential feature. All rent extraction 
requires is mismanagement where the costs of failure are externalized. Indeed, without market 
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signals, managers can undermine firm productivity, and still personally benefit, without even being 
(fully) aware that they are doing so. Meanwhile, rights and offices within complex organizations 
can end up looking like uncodified individual property rights. Academics can discern local 
examples by observing the activities and strategies of senior administrators in some Universities. 
People can dominate within enterprises without any private ownership in sight. Under 
Edmundson’s proposals, business owners are compensated when their firms are large enough to 
be nationalized. So citizen-owners will bear the cost of these destabilizing rivalries. 
 
Private ownership ameliorates these widespread problems. People responsible for how the means 
of production are used absorb most of the costs of their mistakes. This solution often fails and 
establishing effective corporate governance is a work-in-progress but the problem is at least 
acknowledged. A symmetrical comparison of rent-seeking under both public and private 
ownership would put property-owning democracy back in contention as a feasible realization of 
justice as fairness. Under realistic conditions, the more familiar welfare-state capitalism may be 
the best among imperfect alternatives. 
 
It is not all bad news for public ownership. Actually existing democratic capitalisms, ranging from 
relatively small-state regimes like Australia to social democratic systems like Sweden, are all 
mixed economies with substantial public sectors. Successful state-owned firms tend to be carefully 
regulated public utilities or enterprises subject to vigorous, often international, competition – thus 
aligning the incentives of management with the wider public interest. This prosaic reality of public 
ownership resonates somewhat with Meade, who was committed to free trade between nations, 
but not so much with Rawls who was remarkably skeptical of globalization. Critically, widespread 
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public ownership has not been shown to be less prone to permitting domination of the political 
process. In Singapore, for example, they exist side-by-side. 
 
This challenge to Edmundson’s case does not reveal a flaw in the book itself. Rawls was similarly 
disinclined from peering into the black box of public administration. Abstracting away the problem 
of rent-seeking within state institutions is part of a faithful telling of Rawls’ account of justice. 
The clarity and transparency of Edmundson’s argument makes this gap clearer than in the original 
rendition. It makes the Rawlsian case for socialism more explicit to the benefit of both socialist 
proponents and skeptics. John Rawls: Reticent Socialist is a valuable contribution to the debate 
about which social institutions best allow us to treat each other as moral equals. 
 
-Nick Cowen 
New York University School of Law 
